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reece is now clearly on the brink of default. Should one regard as unthinkable that its 
fellow eurozone member countries would allow this to happen? The early history of the 
United States provides an interesting pointer given that the federal budget at that time 
was as small as the EU budget is today. 
Shortly after the end of the American war of independence, the US Treasury assumed the $21 
million in debt (a large sum at that time) that had been accumulated by the 13 founding states. 
The states hardest hit were those without major harbours, which deprived them of the revenues 
that coastal states could earn from the duties imposed on overseas trade. In a scheme devised by 
the first US Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, the federal government assumed all 
of this debt in 1790. Today, many proponents of ‘euro bonds’, i.e. bonds issued by a common 
euro area authority; point to the US experience as a useful example to follow.  
The reaction of the US authorities was radically different about fifty years later, however, when 
in the 1840s the federal government stood by and allowed a number of states to fail. The 
explanation lies in the different sets of historical circumstances leading to the US states’ 
insolvency: the American Revolutionary War was a collective national effort to defeat Great 
Britain and the expenditures by the individual states went to finance this common goal, thereby 
providing a strong argument for the federal government to take over the debts. In the latter case, 
however, the debts had been contracted by the states to finance what were clearly home-grown, 
local projects, for example banks and railroads, aimed at advancing internal state interests.  
It is also interesting to note that this latter set of defaults involved nine (mostly newer) states 
accounting for about one-quarter of the total population of the US and would thus be 
comparable to a collective default by Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain together. What’s 
especially interesting about this episode in US economic history, however, is that no widespread 
contagion ensued. We can thus conclude that a default within a federation does not have to 
trigger catastrophic political consequences. 
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